The formal reconciliation process
to avoid discussions of Indigenous rights, such as a treaty and sovereignty. Kevin Gilbert, poet and author, at a 'Day of Protest and Mourning' at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, held on the 27 May 1992, argued:
We have seen the Australian Government and the Australian people try to get off the hook of responsibility by saying, ten years down the track, we'll have Reconciliation. And Reconciliation doesn't promise us human rights, it doesn't promise us our Sovereign rights or the platform from which to negotiate, and it doesn't promise us a viable land base … It is ten more years of death! (cited in Attwood & Markus 1999, pp.321-322) Bundjalung elder Reverend Frank Roberts, was likewise very critical of the concept of reconciliation. He wrote that a meeting of the Far North Coast NSW Aboriginal Elders Council:
rejected outright the concept of reconciliation at this point in time, believing it is mistimed and premature and would put unborn Aboriginal people in jeopardy. It would only be a token gesture …. To even contemplate reconciliation now would be an act of betrayal. If we reject reconciliation, then a treaty is a must (Roberts 1992, p.5) .
Other Indigenous leaders also expressed reservations about the reconciliation process. Paul Coe, from the NSW Aboriginal Legal Service, stated, 'why should justice for Aboriginal people be delayed till the oppressor is "enlightened" in its attitudes?' (cited in Duke 1992, p.6) . Charles Harris, a retired minister and activist, contended that the initial step in the reconciliation process must be the addressing of 'the just demands of the people. Land rights, sovereignty, etc. must be dealt with' (cited in Wilson 1991 , p. 13). In 1994 an Indigenous activist and a strong advocate for Indigenous sovereignty, argued that in its first few years, the reconciliation process had not shown a desire to work towards changing power relations (Mansell 1994, p.15) .
The Chairperson of CAR from 1991 to 1997 and the person regarded as the 'Father of Reconciliation', Pat Dodson, similarly advocated the importance of Indigenous rights. Early on in the reconciliation process, Dodson stated that the reconciliation process needed to implement a document of reconciliation and to consider a broad range of issues, including sovereignty, constitutional change, Indigenous rights and 'power sharing' (Dodson 1992a, pp.9-11; see Mudrooroo 1995, p.233) .
Some non-Indigenous people, who supported Indigenous rights, were likewise not initially supportive of reconciliation. For example, author Judith Wright, a key member of the Aboriginal Treaty Committee, wrote that reconciliation was a 'mischievous attempt to fool the rest of the world into thinking something constructive is being attempted' (Wright 1992 , cited in Roberts 1993 . Historian Henry Reynolds saw it as a public relations strategy after the policy failures of the 1980s:
it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the process of reconciliation is being pursued because the government must be seen to be doing something, having abandoned the pre-1983 commitment to national land rights legislation and having edged gingerly away from the concept of a treaty promised by the prime minister at Barunga in 1988 (Reynolds 1991, p. 3) .
A prominent non-Indigenous ex-public servant and another key member of the Aboriginal Treaty Committee, H. C. Coombs, contended that CAR was not effective in developing reconciliation as it is not achieving results from the Aboriginal community. They do not, in my view, identify with the process: they are looking for evidence that there is a genuine commitment on the part of the government and on the part of the white Australian community to accept their right to autonomy (cited in Walker 1994, p.14) .
The reactions from some Indigenous leaders to the High Court's 1992 judgement in Mabo and Others v Queensland (No 2) also illustrated the importance that many Indigenous people place upon the recognition of Indigenous rights. Although the Mabo judgement recognised the legal fiction of terra nullius and the continuing, albeit severely diminished, existence of Indigenous native title, it reinforced the rights of the Crown. In a previous judgement, the Seas and Submerged Lands Case 1975 , the High Court decided: 'The acquisition of territory by a sovereign state for the first time is an act of state which cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by the courts of that State' ((1975) 135 CLR 337, 388 The Court was silent on the equally unjust use of the doctrine [of terra nullius] to deny sovereignty. The Court refused to follow precedent on the issue of terra nullius for to do so would be to maintain a legal fiction based on political convenience. Yet the very same convenience was relied on by the Judges to shut the door to any Aboriginal hopes for arguing Aboriginal sovereignty in the Courts (Mansell 1993, pp.4-5; see Reynolds 1998, p.209; Mansell 1992, pp.36-37 (Pearson 1994, p.75; O'Shane 1994, p.29) . The failure of the High Court to address sovereignty was further criticised by non-Indigenous historian Henry Reynolds. Reynolds stated that, 'while the courts demolished the concept of terra nullius in respect of property, it preserved it in relation to sovereignty … [which] lines Australian law up with the international lawyers writing at the high noon of imperialism' (Reynolds 1996, pp.3, 13 (Clark 2000a, p.233) . Similarly, Pat Dodson wrote that there needed to be a 'formal document that recognises and guarantees the rights of indigenous Australians within the Australian Constitution' and that this document would 'provide substantial reconciliation' by addressing: equal human rights and specific Indigenous rights; rights of Indigenous people to maintain their distinct characteristics, identities, laws, cultures, spiritual traditions and languages; the right of Indigenous self-determination; Indigenous control over economic and social development; Indigenous ownership of land and resources and just compensation for land that cannot be returned; the right of Indigenous self-government; constitutional recognition; and the enacting of treaties (Dodson 2000, pp.269, 270-273) . In 1999, Gatjil Djerrkura, then Chairperson of ATSIC, expressed his concerns with the Draft Document for Reconciliation.
I am pessimistic about the prospects of any document which fails squarely to recognise the principle of self-determination gaining support amongst indigenous constituencies. Further, a significant proportion of Aboriginal people in my country continue to assert our unextinguished sovereignty. It is reasonably clear that indigenous people will not agree to any document or documents of reconciliation which compromise these assertions of sovereignty … indigenous Australians are unlikely to conclude that the Draft Declaration represents an accurate reflection of our actual aspirations and entitlements (Djerrkura 1999, pp.6-7) .
This concern that any final document of reconciliation should incorporate Indigenous rights, such as sovereignty and a treaty, was again demonstrated following the release by the Howard Government of the proposed Constitutional Preamble as part of the November 6 1999 Constitutional Referendum. While CAR saw this proposed Preamble as one possibility for a document of reconciliation and 'a definite step forward for reconciliation ' (CAR 1997, p. 4; Scott 1999, p. 17) , many Indigenous leaders argued that the Preamble 'fails to recognise the inherent and distinct rights of the first nations which have been recognised by the High Court' (Agius et al. 1999, p. 15; see Mansell 1999, p. 18) . A meeting of a number of Indigenous leaders unanimously recommended that the 'question on the draft preamble to the Australian Constitution should be dropped from the forthcoming Republic referendum' (Agius et al. 1999, p.15) . One of the participants at this meeting, Pat Dodson, later wrote that all Australians should reject any preamble to our national Constitution that denies the true status of indigenous Australians as the custodians and owners of the land, and suggests that we are nothing more than gardeners at the station homestead (Dodson 2000, p.270 CAR intended the Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation to be an 'aspirational statement' that would be embraced by both non-Indigenous and Indigenous people (CAR 2000a, p.71) . The wording of this final version was:
Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation
We, the peoples of Australia, of many origins as we are, make a commitment to go on together in a spirit of reconciliation.
We value the unique status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as the original owners and custodians of lands and waters.
We recognise this land and its waters were settled as colonies without treaty or consent.
Reaffirming the human rights of all Australians, we respect and recognise continuing customary laws, beliefs and traditions.
Through understanding the spiritual relationship between the land and its first peoples, we share our future and live in harmony.
Our nation must have the courage to own the truth, to heal the wounds of its past so that we can move on together at peace with ourselves.
Reconciliation must live in the hearts and minds of all Australians. Many steps have been taken, many steps remain as we learn our shared histories.
As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and expresses its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the other part accepts the apologies and forgives.
We desire a future where all Australians enjoy their rights, accept their responsibilities, and have the opportunity to achieve their full potential. Clark argued that the 'negotiation of a treaty has never been off our agenda' and that the reconciliation process was imposed upon Indigenous people by former Prime Minister Hawke in response to Indigenous demands for a treaty (Clark 2000b, p.13 ). Clark wrote, 'true reconciliation means recognising we possess distinct rights. They arise from our status as first peoples … a commitment from the government to negotiate a treaty is essential' (Clark 2000c, p.8) . Clark contended that the significant public support for reconciliation shown during Corroboree 2000 illustrated the wider community wanted a 'new deal' for Indigenous people, including a treaty, and was the 'mandate' that Howard claimed he needed in order to negotiate a treaty (Clark 2000b, p.13 These reactions by many in the wider community to the idea of Indigenous rights, such as a treaty and reserved Indigenous seats, were criticised by Pratt, Elder and Ellis:
In so wholeheartedly and enthusiastically taking up the idea of reconciliation as the solution to the effects of colonial power relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, non-Indigenous peoples often slip quickly and unproblematically from solutions articulated by different Indigenous communities and representatives, to actions that often fail to adequately address them. Calls for a treaty between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, for example, are often sidelined by government agendas that seek to minimise any shift in power relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples (Pratt, Elder & Ellis 2001, pp. 135-136) . (Jonas 2001, p.198) . Interestingly, this emphasis by CAR on a treaty in their final report, which was almost entirely lacking during their ten-year existence, was, according to former ATSIC Chairperson, Lowitja O'Donoghue, largely a result of the efforts of Geoff Clark, with the leadership of CAR, Evelyn Scott and Gus Nossal, opposing the reference to a treaty (Nason 2000b, p.5; see Nossal 2000, p.302) . In discussing CAR's final report, Scott illustrated her lukewarm view of a treaty, merely commentating that 'we must have a conversation about these issues' (Scott 2000b, p.13) .
In December 2000, CAR released four booklets that further detailed the national strategies contained in the Roadmap for Reconciliation. These booklets similarly failed to genuinely address Indigenous rights. Overcoming Disadvantage contained over 100 separate actions but generally did not examine rights such as customary law, land rights, a treaty or selfdetermination (CAR 2000d, pp.3-18) . Achieving Economic Independence largely did not address alternative entry programs in education, affirmative action in employment or Indigenous rights to their land in accessing capital (CAR 2000e, pp.3-10) . Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Rights excluded Indigenous sovereignty in its discussions on self-determination and argued some Indigenous rights could only be advanced 'over the longer term' (CAR 2000f, pp.3, 14) . Sustaining the Reconciliation Process recognised, to a limited extent, racism and inequality, yet predominantly focussed on education and symbolism, rather than on Indigenous rights such as a treaty (CAR 2000g, pp.5-8, 23-25) . The most relevant responses of the Government for this paper were those made in regard to the fifth and sixth recommendations. The Howard Government stated that while it supported some agreements, such as Indigenous Land Use Agreements on native title, it did not support the concept of a treaty because such a legally enforceable instrument, as between sovereign states would be divisive, would undermine the concept of a single Australian nation, would create legal uncertainty and future disputation and would not best harness the positive environment that now exists in reconciliation. In fact, such a process could threaten that environment (Commonwealth Government 2002, p.23) .
In this paper, I examined the 1991-2000 formal reconciliation process in Australia and the failure of this process and governments, particularly the Howard Government, to genuinely recognise Indigenous rights. This failure occurred despite numerous Indigenous leaders consistently advocating the need to recognise Indigenous rights, including sovereignty, selfdetermination, a treaty, parliamentary representation, land rights and native title, throughout the reconciliation decade.
The recognition of Indigenous rights would significantly address one of the key elements of reconciliation -that of justice. However, the 1991-2000 process focussed on other elements of reconciliation, particularly peace, forgiveness and repentance. Subsequently, the reconciliation process, in failing to recognise Indigenous rights and in marginalising the notion of justice, did not achieve its overall aim of reconciling Indigenous and nonIndigenous peoples by 2001 (see Gunstone 2009 ).
For any future reconciliation process in Australia to have any chance of genuinely achieving a substantive reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, the reconciliation process must address the key element of justice by recognising those Indigenous rights that have been demanded by Indigenous leaders for decades.
